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COMPENSATING DIFFERENTIALS AND UNMEASURED 
ABILITY IN THE LABOR MARKET FOR NURSES: 
WHY DO HOSPITALS PAY MORE? 
EDWARD J. SCHUMACHER and BARRY T. HIRSCH* 
Registered nurses (RNs) employed in hospitals realize a large wage 
advantage relative to RNs employed elsewhere. Cross-sectional esti- 
mates indicate a hospital RN wage advantage of roughly 20%. This 
paper examines possible sources of the hospital premium, a topic of 
some interest given the current shifting of medical care out of hospitals. 
Longitudinal analysis of Current Population Survey data for 1979-94 
suggests that a third to a half of the advantage is due to unmeasured 
worker ability, and the authors conclude that the remainder of the 
advantage probably reflects compensating differentials for hospital 
disamenities. Supporting these conclusions is evidence that hospital 
RNs have higher cognitive ability and higher-quality job experience 
than non-hospital RNs, and indications that shift work accounts for 
roughly 10% of the hospital premium. 
Hospitals play a crucial role in the labor 
market for nurses. More than 70% of 
all registered nurses (RNs) and even more 
young RNs are employed in hospitals. This 
paper examines the earnings of RNs, focus- 
ing specifically on the sources of what is a 
large wage differential between hospital 
and non-hospital nurses. An understand- 
*Edward J. Schumacher is Assistant Professor of 
Economics at East Carolina University in Greenville, 
and Barry T. Hirsch is Professor of Economics and 
Research Associate, Pepper Institute on Aging and 
Public Policy, at Florida State University in Tallahas- 
see. The authors appreciate helpful suggestions from 
Marjorie Baldwin, Marie Cowart, Gary Fournier, David 
Macpherson, and Lester Zeager. The CPS data sets 
used in this paper were developed with the assistance 
of David Macpherson. 
ing of the hospital premium is important, 
especially given what is expected to be a 
large shift of medical care delivery away 
from hospitals and toward outpatient set- 
tings. 
We first present evidence on the hospital 
premium using multiple years (1979-94) 
of a large cross-sectional data set. We then 
conduct a longitudinal analysis based on 
multiple panels of registered nurses, a pro- 
cedure that allows the hospital premium to 
be estimated net of individual-specific skill 
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authors. Schumacher: Department of Economics, 
East Carolina University, Greenville, NC 27858. 
Hirsch: Department of Economics, Florida State 
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or taste differences. What remains of the 
premium provides an estimate of the com- 
pensating differential due to job disamen- 
ities or other unmeasured factors. We fur- 
ther explore sources of the premium by 
examining differences between hospital and 
non-hospital RNs in pension and insurance 
coverage, cognitive ability (as measured by 
AFQT scores), quality of work experience, 
returns to union coverage, and work shift 
differentials. We also look at hospital and 
non-hospital earnings in alternative occu- 
pations. 
Wage Differentials Between 
Hospital and Non-Hospital Employees 
Previous studies of the nursing labor 
market have noted large earnings differ- 
ences between similar hospital and non- 
hospital RNs, but have not focused on ex- 
plaining this premium. For example, Link 
(1988) found that there was a hospital pre- 
mium of around 13% in 1984 (but did not 
find a premium in an analysis of 1977 data). 
Booton and Lane (1985), using data from a 
1981 survey of Utah RNs, found that the 
hospital premium was largest for associate 
degree RNs (21%) and smallest for diploma 
RNs (15 %). And Lehrer et al. (1991), using 
a sample of Illinois RNs, noted a large 
difference in earnings between hospital and 
non-hospital RNs. Although the hospital 
premium was not the focus of their paper, 
they suggested that it might reflect a com- 
pensating differential. 
Why might nursing wages differ across 
sectors? If nurses have similar skills and 
preferences, all nursing jobs are equally 
attractive, and hospital and non-hospital 
employers (that is, physicians' offices, nurs- 
ing homes, and so on) compete in the same 
market for RNs (or, equivalently, there is 
labor mobility), in the long run there should 
be no earnings differences between the 
hospital and non-hospital sectors. Long- 
run equilibrium wage differentials among 
RNs will arise, however, to the extent that 
there are differences in skills and working 
conditions across sectors. 
A plausible explanation for the hospital 
premium is that hospitals demand, attract, 
and retain higher-quality nurses than do 
employers in the non-hospital sector, and 
these skills are not reflected fully in mea- 
sured variables. Hospitals provide medical 
services requiring skill-intensive inputs of 
nursing services, and some of these skills 
are not required in non-hospital sectors. 
Highly skilled and motivated nurses may be 
attracted to hospital employment, where 
their skills can best be used. The outcome 
of such labor market sorting is an equilib- 
rium in which hospital RNs realize higher 
wages than RNs outside of hospitals. At the 
level of measurement, accurate data on 
human capital and other productivity-re- 
lated worker attributes would lower esti- 
mates of the hospital premium. Although 
differences in RN quality are generally ob- 
servable to employers, they are largely un- 
measured in standard data sets. Hence, a 
significant portion of the measured hospi- 
tal wage premium is likely to be a compen- 
sating skill differential. 
The other principal explanation for the 
hospital premium, emphasized by Lehrer 
et al. (1991) and others, is that there exist 
differences injob attributes between hospi- 
tal and non-hospital settings. If hospital 
jobs involve relatively unpleasant charac- 
teristics (irregular or late shifts, a high 
degree of stress, job hazards, and so on), 
hospitals must pay a compensating differ- 
ential to attract nurses of a given quality. 
For example, nurses are likely to prefer the 
regular hours, a relatively low-risk work 
environment, and close relationship with 
colleagues that working in a practitioner's 
office may offer.' If the tastes and prefer- 
'Job evaluation ratings from the Dictionary of Occu- 
pational Titles (DOT) give credence to both the skill 
and working conditions explanations for the hospital 
premium. Most DOT ratings are identical for the 
occupational titles "general duty nurse" (RNs who 
provide general nursing care to patients in hospitals 
and other health care facilities) and "nurse, office" 
(RNs who care for and treat patients in medical 
offices as directed by physicians). Differences are 
that general (or hospital) RNs, as compared to RNs in 
physician offices, are rated as requiring greater math- 
ematical development, more complexity in dealing 
with people, greater strength, more frequent stoop- 
ing and bending of the body, greater ability to per- 
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ences of RNs are sufficiently heterogeneous, 
compensating wage differentials hould be 
small, but to the extent that preferences for 
these characteristics are strong and similar, 
wage differentials may be sizable.2 
Although differences in RN skills and 
working conditions between hospital and 
non-hospital employment are likely to be 
the principal explanation for the large hos- 
pital wage advantage, other possibilities can 
be considered. In a later section of this 
paper, we examine the possibility that the 
hospital differential is accounted for by a 
lower level of fringe benefits, by labor union 
bargaining power, and by differences in 
employer size. 
An additional possibility is that the dif- 
ferential represents a true rent. Hospitals 
may choose to pay an "efficiency" wage that 
exceeds the opportunity cost wage if doing 
so results in increased worker effort and 
reduced monitoring costs (see, for example, 
Weiss 1990). The hospital premium acts as 
a "carrot" to induce a high level of effort, or 
equivalently, the threat of losing the pre- 
mium acts as a "stick" to prevent shirking. 
Consistent with the efficiency wage hy- 
pothesis is the finding by Groshen and 
Krueger (1990) that hospitals with greater 
supervision tend to pay lower wages than 
hospitals with less employee monitoring, as 
measured by the ratio of supervisory staff to 
total nursing personnel (Groshen and 
Krueger did not compare hospitals with 
non-hospital settings). On the other hand, 
ceive attributes of objects through feeling, fuller ad- 
justment of eyes to bring objects into focus, greater 
ability to distinguish colors, and exposure to higher 
noise levels (USDOL 1993:373). 
2Estimates of wage differentials across groups may 
be biased because of differences in worker tastes and 
abilities. This is a general problem, because standard 
data sets do not have adequate measures of working 
conditions and estimation of compensating differen- 
tials is not straightforward even when such data exist 
(Hwang et al. 1992). This study has the advantage 
that it focuses primarily on differentials within a 
single occupation, so preferences and abilities are 
more homogeneous than for broader groups of work- 
ers. In addition, our longitudinal analysis accounts 
for many differences in worker-specific preferences 
and ability not measured directly in the data. 
an implication of efficiency wage models is 
that since workers receive rents, sectors 
paying efficiency wages should have large 
queues of qualified applicants (Weiss 
1990:55)-whereas hospitals during the 
1980s, on the contrary, were characterized 
by reports of severe RN shortages (Curran 
et al. 1987). Efficiency wages, therefore, 
are not likely to provide the primary expla- 
nation for the hospital premium. 
Some have argued that hospitals face an 
upward-sloping supply curve for RNs and 
thus possess monopsony power. This is not 
a plausible explanation for the hospital 
premiumn. First, the exercise of monopsony 
power would lead either to lower wages in 
hospitals than in competitive non-hospital 
markets or to lower wages in both sectors if 
hospitals are price leaders. Second, recent 
evidence (Hirsch and Schumacher 1995) 
casts serious doubt on the hypothesis that 
monopsony plays a significant role in nurs- 
ing labor markets. 
A final possibility is that the hospital 
premium is partly accountable to quasi- 
rents produced by the rapid growth in 
health care costs over the past two decades, 
a growth paralleled by growth in nursing 
wages. The existence of quasi-rents is both 
possible and likely, but it cannot explain 
much of the hospital premium. Even if 
health care expenditure growth were con- 
centrated in hospitals, quasi-rents to hospi- 
tal RNs would not survive in the long run, 
since RNs are mobile across sectors and 
rents would be dissipated. It is implausible 
that a sizable portion of the hospital pre- 
mium, which has remained large over many 
years, could reflect short-run quasi-rents. 
Cross-Sectional Evidence on 
the Hospital Wage Differential 
The Cross-Sectional Data 
In order to estimate the wage differen- 
tial between hospital nurses and those em- 
ployed in other sectors, we must account 
for differences across individuals in human 
capital and other earnings-related charac- 
teristics. The cross-sectional data for this 
study are drawn from the monthly Current 
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Table 1. Means of Selected Characteristics 
for RNs, by Employment Status. 
Nursing Practitioner's Other 
Characteristic Hospital Home Office Industry 
Real Wage 16.73 13.72 14.08 15.44 
Years of 
Schooling 14.98 14.44 14.71 15.18 
Age 37.26 44.29 41.06 41.94 
Union Coverage 0.21 0.10 0.03 0.23 
Percent Part- 
Time 0.28 0.39 0.39 0.27 
Public 
Employment 0.21 0.15 0.08 0.45 
Metro Area 
(1,000,000+) 0.42 0.36 0.33 0.41 
Sample Size 32,306 3,405 2,513 7,473 
Source: CPS ORG files for the years 1979-94. 
Notes: Real Wage is the mean wage measured in 
December 1994 dollars using the CPI-U. Practitioner's 
Office includes nurses employed in the offices of 
physicians, dentists, chiropractors, and optometrists 
as well as in the offices of health practitioners not 
elsewhere classified. Union coverage is based on the 
1983-94 ORG files. 
Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rota- 
tion Group (ORG) earnings files forJanu- 
ary 1979 through December 1994. The 
CPS, conducted monthly by the Bureau of 
the Census, is the primary U.S. household 
survey. Advantages of the CPS over other 
data sets used to study RN wages are that 
data are available on an annual basis, RN 
wages can be compared to non-nursing 
wages, and large panels can be constructed 
to make possible longitudinal wage change 
analysis. 
We include in our RN sample (n = 45,697) 
all employed wage and salary registered 
nurses ages 20 and over whose major activ- 
ity was not schooling. Table 1 presents 
mean characteristics for RNs for the years 
1979-94 by employment status. RN em- 
ployment is partitioned into four sectors: 
hospitals, nursing homes, offices of health 
practitioners (including physicians, den- 
tists, chiropractors, optometrists, and health 
practitioners not elsewhere classified), and 
other industry.3 The mean real wage rate 
3The largest industr-y classifications in the "other 
industry" group are health services not elsewhere 
for hospital RNs is about $3 more than that 
for RNs in practitioners' offices or nursing 
homes (in December 1994 dollars).' Com- 
pared to RNs in other sectors, hospital RNs, 
on average, are younger, have higher union 
coverage, and are more likely to be em- 
ployed in large metropolitan areas and in 
public jobs (federal, state, or local). 
The Cross-Sectional Model and Results 
Next, a standard log wage equation of 
the following form is estimated: 
(1) InWi= fi, X0+ E OhINDih 
j = I h = 2 
y 
+ 2 YEARiy + ei, y=2 
where lnW is the log of the real wage for 
nurse i, XcontainsJ- 1 personal, job, and 
labor market characteristics (for example, 
education, potential experience, union sta- 
tus, and region), and 3 contains the corre- 
sponding coefficients (XI = 1 and PI is the 
intercept). IND contains H - 1 dummy 
variables designating hospital or other sec- 
tors of employment. The coefficients in 0 
are the adjusted log earnings differences by 
sector relative to the omitted group. YEAR 
includes dummy variables for the years 
1980-94. For now, ei is assumed to be a well- 
classified (6.8% of the entire sample), elementary 
and secondary schools (2.3%), and personnel supply 
services (this includes nursing temporary agencies 
and home health services, and accounts for 2% of the 
entire sample). 
4Weekly earnings are top-coded at $999 per week 
in the surveys through 1988, and at $1,923 beginning 
in January 1989. A maximum of 1.2% of RNs are at 
the earnings cap in any year (1988); 0.4% are at the 
cap in 1994. The control group (described below) 
includes 3.9% at the cap in 1988 and 0.5% in 1994. 
For workers at the cap, we assign the estimated mean 
earnings above the cap based on the assumption that 
the upper tail is characterized by a Pareto distribu- 
tion (see Hirsch and Macpherson 1996:6). We omit 
individuals with an implied real hourly wage (that is, 
usual weekly earnings divided by usual hours worked 
per week) less than $1.00 or greater than $99.99. 
These groups likely represent those with mismeasured 
earnings or hours of work. 
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Figutre 1. RN and Control Group Wage Growth and Hospital Wage Differential, 1979-1994. 
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Notes: Data are from the CPS ORG files for 1979-94. The series RN, LPN, and Control plot regression 
coefficients onyear dummies (1979 = 0) from log wage equations run separately for each group. See the text for a 
description of the control group and for discussion of the variables included in the wage equations. The hospital 
differential series was calculated from an RN log-wage regression that included separate year dummies interacted 
with hospital employment (plus year dummies not interacted), thus providing annual estimates of the hospital 
premium for 1979-94. 
behaved error term; we omit the time sub- 
script t for convenience. 
Table 2 presents regression results from 
equation 1.5 Turning first to the employ- 
5Variables in the regressions other than controls 
for sector of employment are years of schooling, 
potential experience and its square, and dummies for 
race (2), Hispanic status, gender, region (8), MSA/ 
CMSA size (7) for observations after October 1985, 
SMSA size (2) for observations prior to October 1985, 
marital status (2), part-time status (usual hours worked 
per week less than 35), public employment, and year 
(15). The metropolitan area size dummies are in- 
cluded to capture differences in cost of living and 
local area amenities. DuMond, Hirsch, and 
Macpherson (1996) found that detailed region and 
city size dummies account for two-thirds of the varia- 
tion in cost of living across 182 metropolitan areas, 
and that inclusion of such controls in a wage equation 
ment sector dummies, after we account for 
measured characteristics, we find large dif- 
is preferable to both estimation of a nominal wage 
equation without controls and the full adjustment of 
wages for measured cost of living differences. Results 
here are highly similar when a single dummy for large 
metropolitan area (1 million plus) is instead included. 
Many large hospitals are situated in the central cities 
of urban areas, whereas other medical facilities are 
located in the suburbs. Hence, part of the hospital 
premium could reflect an urban wage gradient. In 
subsequent longitudinal analysis, we measure the 
hospital wage differential following control for worker- 
specific skills. The remaining differential is attrib- 
uted largely to what we believe are unmeasured dif- 
ferences in working conditions, including, among 
other things, the location of employment. The CPS 
contains information on central city residence, but 
no information on employment location. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Registered Nurses' 
Earnings: Wage-Level Regression Results. 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Coefficient Estimates 
Variable (1) (2) 
Hospital 0.157 0.127 
(0.003) (0.004) 
Practitioner's Office -0.078 
(0.007) 
Nursing Home -0.059 
(0.007) 
Schooling 0.034 0.033 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Potential Experience 0.014 0.013 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Potential Experience -0.028 -0.023 
Squared/ 100 (0.001) (0.001) 
Black -0.101 -0.102 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Other Race -0.043 -0.041 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Hispanic -0.049 -0.051 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Female -0.027 -0.028 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Part-Time Status (hours 0.001 0.002 
worked per week < 35) (0.003) (0.003) 
Public Employment 0.027 0.017 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Married, Spouse Present 0.014 0.014 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Separated, Divorced, or 0.010 0.010 
Widowed (0.006) (0.006) 
Sample Size 45,697 45,697 
Source: CPS ORG files for the years 1979-94. 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the real 
wage. The omitted category in column 1 is all non- 
hospital employment; in column 2 "other industry" is 
omitted. Beginning in October 1985, the CPS identi- 
fied 202 MSA/CMSAs; before, only 44 SMSAs were 
identified. For observations prior to October 1985 we 
include 3 size dummies, and for observations after 
that time we include 7 size dummies. Other variables 
included in the regression are dummies for region 
(8) and year (shown in Figure 1). Potential Experi- 
ence is measured as the lesser of age minus school 
minus six or age minus 16. 
ferences in earnings for RNs across sectors. 
Inclusion of a single dummy variable for 
hospital employment (column 1) indicates 
that hospital RNs earn 17.0% higher wages 
than non-hospital RNs. Results in column 
2, based on a regression including separate 
dummies for the four industry categories, 
reveal that hospital RNs earn 22.8% more 
than RNs employed in health practitioners' 
offices and 20.4% more than RNs employed 
in nursing homes (other industry is the 
omitted group).6 Figure 1 (right scale) 
plots the hospital differential estimated 
separately by year. This regression is simi- 
lar to that in column one, except that the 
hospital RN dummy is interacted with year 
dummies. Estimates vary modestly from 
year to year. We are not willing to infer the 
presence of trends based on this evidence, 
although the decline since 1992 is intrigu- 
ing. Results presented throughout the re- 
mainder of the paper use the pooled 1979- 
94 sample. Inferences based on estimates 
from subsets of the sample are identical. 
Since RNs' job duties are likely to vary in 
and out of hospitals, a concern is that the 
measured hospital premium in part reflects 
occupational returns within the RN profes- 
sion. The CPS does not allow us to distin- 
guish staff RNs from, say, head nurses or 
specialists. The Sample Survey of Regis- 
tered Nurses, however, contains this infor- 
mation.7 In a regression pooling the 1984, 
1988, and 1992 SSRN and including vari- 
ables similar to those used in Table 2 (but 
without occupational controls), we find that 
hospital RNs earned about 17.6% higher 
wages than non-hospital RNs, a result highly 
similar to our CPS estimate. When we 
include four separate occupational con- 
trols (administrator; head nurse/supervi- 
sor; staff, general duty, or private duty nurse; 
and specialist, with "other" position as the 
6The percentage difference in wages between hos- 
pital and practitioner's office RNs is calculated from 
the log difference using [exp(0.127 + 0.078) - 1] 100, 
and a similar calculation is used for nursing home 
RNs. 
7The SSRN is a survey conducted by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Public 
Health Services, Health Resource and Services Ad- 
ministration. The survey is mailed to a sample of 
currently licensed registered nurses and includes in- 
formation on their education and work history. The 
SSRN provides roughly 25,000 observations per sur- 
vey. 
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omitted group), the hospital differential 
increases slightly, to 20.0%. The hospital 
premium, therefore, does not appear to be 
driven by occupational differences between 
sectors. 
Although the major focus of the paper is 
the effect of hospital employment on earn- 
ings, other wage determinants presented 
in Table 2 are of interest. Wages of black 
RNs are 9.6% lower than those of white 
RNs. There is only a small difference in 
earnings between those employed by the 
public sector (federal, state, or local gov- 
ernment) and those in the private sector. 
Marital status has only a marginal impact 
on wages, and, in sharp contrast with 
economy-wide evidence, male and female 
RNs earn similar wages. Also, RNs who 
typically work less than 35 hours per week 
earn wages similar to those of RNs who 
work full-time, in contrast to the substan- 
tial part-time penalty in the labor market as 
a whole (a similar result is obtained using 
the SSRN). 
Not shown in Table 2 are coefficients on 
the year dummies, reflecting the growth in 
real wages during the 1979-94 period fol- 
lowing control for measured characteris- 
tics. Figure 1 (left scale) plots these coeffi- 
cients for RNs, as well as similar coefficients 
from separate wage regressions for licensed 
practical nurses (LPNs) and a comparison 
group of female workers, the latter to re- 
flect economy-wide movements in wage 
rates. The comparison group is college- 
educated women (those with at least 16 
years' schooling) in non-health-related 
occupations.8 
The figure shows that with controls for 
measured characteristics, real and relative 
wages of RNs rose substantially over the 
period. An RN in 1993 earned .251 log 
points or 28.5% higher real wages than a 
similar RN in 1979. This growth was par- 
8The control group consists of the following broad 
occupational categories: executive, administrative, 
and managerial; professional specialty occupations; 
technicians and related support; sales, administrative 
support, and clerical; and service occupations (ex- 
cept protective and household services). 
ticularly rapid in the mid- to late 1980s, a 
period when reported nursing shortages 
were most severe. The RN wage index 
peaks in 1993 and falls rather sharply, so 
that by 1994 the wage advantage relative to 
a similar RN in 1979 had fallen to .204 log 
points.9 LPN wages followed a pattern simi- 
lar to that for RNs, with wage growth slower 
in the late 1980s, but no decline in 1994 
(annual sample sizes of LPNs are small). In 
contrast, the comparison group of college- 
educated women experienced far more 
modest wage growth over the period, earn- 
ing 7.6% higher real wages in 1994 than in 
1979. Note that the rising wages for RNs 
relative to this comparison group are par- 
ticularly noteworthy since there were wid- 
ening skill and narrowing gender wage gaps 
over the period (Levy and Murnane 1992). 
Wage growth for RNs substantially exceeded 
that for male and female workers economy- 
wide (these results not shown). 
Longitudinal Evidence on 
the Hospital Wage Differential 
Estimates of the hospital premium from 
wage level equations may be biased owing 
to omitted measures of worker ability. If 
RN skills are not adequately measured by 
years of schooling, potential experience, 
and the other right-hand-side variables, and 
if omitted measures of human capital are 
correlated with hospital employment, the 
hospital coefficient in a wage level equa- 
tion will be a biased measure of the hospital 
priemium. The hospital premium observed 
in our cross-sectional analysis is likely to 
reflect both compensating differentials for 
working conditions and unmeasured dif- 
ferences in ability correlated with hospital 
employment.10 In this section we attempt 
9Results from Employment and Earnings, based on 
CPS data, suggest that real earnings have continued 
to fall. Median full-time weekly earnings among RNs 
in 1996 were $697 (January 1997, Table 39, p. 206), as 
compared to figures-for 1995, 1994, and 1993 of $716, 
$722, and $746, respectively, in constant 1996 dollars. 
10For an analysis of the econometric issues associ- 
ated with longitudinal estimation, see Jakubson 
(1991). 
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to determine the extent of such bias and to 
obtain longitudinal estimates of the hospi- 
tal premium that account for unmeasured 
worker skills. 
The Wage Change Model 
Below, we modify equation (1) to ac- 
count for unmeasured worker-specific skill 
differences fixed over a one-year period. 
Letting X, represent the fixed effect on log 
wages for worker 1 and adding a time sub- 
script t, the wage equation can be written as 
J H 
(2) In Win = , jXijt +Y0(INDiht 
y 
+ 2;, y YEARiy + Xi + e it . 
y =1 
The error term in equation 1 is divided into 
an individual-specific quality component 
(Xi) fixed over time (one year) and a ran- 
dom, well-behaved, component (el'). If the 
omitted fixed effect, X, is positively corre- 
lated with hospital employment (that is, 
more able workers are located in hospi- 
tals), then estimates of the hospital wage 
premium from equation (2) are biased 
upward. 
Letting A represent changes between 
adjacent years, a wage change equation will 
take the form (dropping the individual sub- 
script i) 
J H 
(3) Aln Wd=X jAXjd+ YhAINDhd 
A 
+ X PdPERIODd + Ae d, 
d = 2 
where d indexes the time periods over 
which values are differenced, and PERIOD d 
are dummies for the periods 1980/81 
through 1994/95 (with 1979/80 as the ref- 
erence period). The major distinction be- 
tween equations (3) and (2) is that the 
effects owing to unmeasured skills fall out, 
potentially allowing for unbiased estimates 
of the quality-constant hospital premium. 
Equation (3) provides an unbiased mea- 
sure of the hospital wage differential if 
sectoral switching is exogenous and ability 
is equally valued at the margin by employ- 
ers in both sectors (Gibbons and Katz 
1992).1" The estimate of the hospital 
premium is based on the change in wages 
for RNs who switch either into or out of 
hospital employment. If the hospital 
premium is due entirely to hospitals at- 
tracting higher-skilled nurses, then the 
estimate of 0 in the wage change equa- 
tion should be close to zero, assuming 
marginal products are equivalent across 
sectors. 
The specification in equation (3) restricts 
the estimates in 0 to be symmetrical, so that 
the wage gains for hospital joiners are 
equivalent to the wage losses for hospital 
leavers, and the gains for hospital stayers 
are the same as those for non-hospital 
stayers.'2 To relax this assumption, we 
subsequently include dummies for entry 
into a hospital, exit out of a hospital, and 
employment in a hospital in the first year. 
The coefficients on the joining and leav- 
ing variables measure the change in the 
"If there is a comparative advantage among RN 
switchers such that hospital RNs are absolutely more 
productive in hospitals and absolutely less able than 
other RNs in, say, nursing homes, then our interpre- 
tation does not follow. In that case the interpretation 
of the wage change results depends on the reason why 
people are switching industries. More generally, 
endogenous job and sectoral change may bias wage 
change estimates. Biases exist in both directions. 
For example, assume a hospital hires what turns 
out to be a low-ability nurse at the going hospital 
wage. Once the mismatch is revealed, the nurse may 
move to a lower-paying non-hospital job. This would 
bias upward longitudinal estimates of the hospital 
premium, since we would observe a large wage de- 
cline. On the other hand, hospital nurses with an 
unusually low current wage, or an unusually high 
wage offer from a non-hospital employer, are most 
likely to voluntarily switch sectors, leading to a down- 
ward bias in hospital premium estimates. Insufficient 
information is available to explicitly model selection 
effects on job change. 
'2Joiner and leaver coefficients may differ if, for 
example, slopes of wage profiles differ. A steeper 
wage profile implies smaller gains for entrants than 
losses for leavers. If hospitals tend to have flatter 
profiles than the non-hospital sector, we may expect 
a premium to hospital joiners larger than the loss to 
hospital leavers. 
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log wage, as compared to staying in non- 
hospital or hospital employment, respec- 
tively. Although such a specification is 
less restrictive, the gain from reduced 
bias is offset in part by the loss of preci- 
sion attaching to separate estimates based 
on the smaller samples of hospital join- 
ers and leavers. 
The Longitudinal Data 
Panel data are constructed from two 
sources (the appendix provides a detailed 
description). First, we constructed mul- 
tiple panels from the CPS ORG files for 
1979/80 through 1993/94 by matching in- 
dividuals in the same month in consecutive 
years. Second, we used the March CPS 
surveys for 1980-95. These surveys contain 
retrospective information on each worker's 
employment in the previous year, including 
the number of employers, the occupation 
and industry in which the employee was 
employed for the longest period, total earn- 
ings from all jobs, total weeks worked, and 
usual hours worked per week. The March 
surveys also contain information on current 
earnings (on the primaryjob) and employ- 
ment for a quarter of the sample (the out- 
going rotation groups). Those who are not 
outgoing in March provide information on 
current earnings in either April, May, or 
June. Matching the March surveys with the 
ORG files for these months provides a nearly 
full sample of March CPS respondents for 
1979/80 through 1994/95. 
In order to maximize sample size, we 
combined the ORG and March panel data 
sets, after eliminating from the ORG panel 
individuals surveyed in the months of 
March, April, May, orJune (since they are 
already in the March panels). Because 
measurement error is a particular concern 
in longitudinal analysis, those with indus- 
try, occupation, or earnings allocated (that 
is, assigned) by the Census are deleted from 
the sample. The resulting panel data set 
for 1979/80 through 1994/95 contains data 
on 17,327 RNs, each observed in consecu- 
tive years. Of these, 11,887 (68.6%) were 
employed in a hospital in both years, 4,579 
(26.4%) were employed outside of hospi- 
tals in both years, 338 (2.0%) switched to 
hospital employment, and 523 (3.0%) left 
hospital employment. 
It is important to note that there exists a 
bias toward zero in panel estimates using 
both the March and ORG data sets. Due to 
the method of measuring the initial (year 
1) wage in the March surveys, a downward 
bias will be present to the extent that the 
wage in year 1 reflects the wage in the new 
employment setting and lowers the observed 
effect of changing industry. This is because 
the previous year's wage is calculated from 
earnings on all jobs. For example, an RN 
who moves to a hospital from a health 
practitioner's office late in the first year will 
report that the industry in which he or she 
was employed for the longest period last 
year was a health practitioner's office. That 
RN's earnings from last year, however, will 
include the increase in wages due to hospi- 
tal employment, and will bias downward 
the estimated effects of joining a hospital. 
The true wage effects ofjoining a hospital, 
therefore, are somewhat larger than sug- 
gested by the coefficient estimates. Calcu- 
lations in Macpherson and Hirsch 
(1995:458n) suggest a bias of about 15%. 
The ORG panels, although they do not 
suffer from the downward bias described 
above, are more likely to contain measure- 
ment error in the industry (that is, hospi- 
tal) variable. These panels are constructed 
from two separate surveys potentially in- 
volving two separate interviewers and 
interviewees, whereas the March data are 
collected at a single point in time. Mea- 
surement error lowers the signal-to-noise 
ratio and biases estimates of the effects of 
changing employment status toward zero. 
The BLS has examined the issue of occu- 
pation and industry coding in the CPS in 
some detail (Polivka and Rothgeb 1993). 
Measurement error on industry assignment 
is rather modest, while that on detailed 
occupation is substantial. We are not con- 
cerned with measurement error on occu- 
pation, since we do not include occupa- 
tional switchers in our analysis. Measure- 
ment error appears less likely to affect hos- 
pital (that is, industry) employment than 
employment in many other industries, given 
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7'able 3. Wage Level and Change 
Regression Results for Registered Nurses. 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Dependent Variable 
Independent 
Variable InW AInW AInW AInW 
HOSP 0.163 
(0.005) 
AHOSP 0.079 0.071 
(0.012) (0.012) 
AHosP*Mover 0.087 
(0.046) 
Mover 0.008 
(0.014) 
AHOSP*Practitioner - 0.175 
(0.029) 
AHosP*NurHome 0.100 
(0.024) 
AHosP*Other 0.050 
(0.015) 
Adj. R2 0.215 0.014 0.014 0.015 
n 17,327 17,327 17,327 17,327 
Source: Combined ORG/March panels from 1979/ 
80 through 1994/95. 
Notes: The regression in Column (1) is a levels 
regression with the log of the real wage in year 2 as the 
dependent variable. HOSP is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the individual is employed in a hospital in 
year 2. The regressions in columns (2), (3), and (4) 
are wage change regressions with the change in the 
log of the real wage as the dependent variable. AHOSP 
is the change in hospital employment status between 
years, and equals 1 (-1) if the individual joined (left) 
hospital employment between years and zero other- 
wise. A Mover is defined as an individual who changed 
counties between years. The March 1985 survey ques- 
tion on moving differs from the corresponding ques- 
tion in other years. A dummy variable was included 
for these individuals so that estimates presented in 
the table would not be affected. In addition to the 
variables indicated, these regressions include the 
change in public sector status, the change in part- 
time status, the change in experience squared, year 
dummies, and a dummy designating those in the 
March panel. These regressions do not include the 
change in schooling, race, region, metropolitan area, 
or sex. 
that respondents provide the name of their 
employer and coders assign the industry 
code. 
In order to gain additional insight into 
this issue, however, we turn to the 1992 
SSRN, which for the first time asked RNs 
their employment setting (hospital, nurs- 
ing home, and so on) the previous year and 
if they were employed by the same em- 
ployer in the same position last year. This 
provides us with an independent measure 
of the extent of moving among RNs, one 
likely to have little measurement error. In 
the merged March/ORG panel, 2.0% of 
the sample were hospital joiners and 3.0% 
were hospital leavers. Analogous numbers 
from the SSRN (we define a switcher as an 
RN who says she changed employers and 
who has changed from hospital to non- 
hospital employment, or vice-versa) indi- 
cate that 1.9% were hospital joiners and 
3.2% were hospital leavers. Such a close 
correspondence, which suggests that mea- 
surement error associated with our hospi- 
tal switching variable is small, increases 
confidence in the paper's principal results.3 
Wage Change Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the wage 
change regression models.4 For compari- 
son, the first column presents the hospital 
coefficient from a standard log wage re- 
gression run in levels using the year 2 infor- 
mation from the panel data set (non-hospi- 
tal employment is the omitted category). 
The second column displays results from 
estimating equation (3) with a single vari- 
able for the change in hospital employ- 
ment. The coefficient falls from 0.163 in 
13Because the SSRN does not contain information 
about earnings or hours worked the previous year, 
wage change analysis is not possible. 
"I4ndividuals with top-coded (that is, capped) earn- 
ings in either year are omitted from the wage change 
models, as are those with values of occupation, indus- 
try, or weekly earnings that have been allocated (that 
is, assigned) by the Census. Hourly. earnings calcu- 
lated from March retrospective surveys for the previ- 
ous year tend to be higher than current earnings from. 
the CPS ORG for the second year, in part because the 
former includes earnings from alljobs. We include a 
dummy variable in the wage change equations desig- 
nating whether the observation is from the March 
sample. This dummy yields a significant coefficient 
of about -.07. When we estimate wage change models 
separately for each data set, we arrive at the same 
conclusions presented in the paper. 
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the levels equation to 0.079 in the change 
equation, suggesting that approximately 
half of the hospital premium is due to 
higher unmeasured skills among hospital 
RNs. The hospital premium, following con- 
trol for worker-specific skills, is about 8%. 
These results provide support for our hy- 
pothesis that a substantial portion of the 
observed hospital wage advantage reflects 
higher skills among hospital RNs. 
The March CPS data contain informa- 
tion on geographic mobility and allow the 
effects of changing hospital employment to 
be estimated net of any mobility effects. 
Individuals in the ORG panels are by defi- 
nition non-movers, since if they changed 
households they are no longer included in 
the CPS and cannot be in the panel. A 
mover is defined here as an individual who 
changed counties between years. The re- 
sults in column 3 capture the interaction 
between the change in hospital employ- 
ment and the decision to move. The dummy 
variable AHosP*Mover is set to 1 (-1) when 
the individual bothjoins (leaves) a hospital 
and moves and 0 otherwise. 
The results indicate particularly large 
wage changes for those who move and 
change hospital status-.158 log points 
(.071+.087) versus .071 for non-movers 
changing hospital status. RNs moving but 
not changing hospital status exhibit virtu- 
ally no real wage gain (.008), as compared 
to those who do not move. We are reluctant 
to attach much weight to the large wage 
changes among RNs who both move geo- 
graphically and change sector of employ- 
ment, given the small number in this group 
(61) and the absence of wage changes for 
RNs who are geographic movers but do not 
"5One could, argue that geographic movers may 
readily obtain information about what are relatively 
homogeneousjob opportunities among a city's hospi- 
tals, and at the same time have poor information 
regarding the rather diverse job opportunities in 
practitioner offices, outpatient health facilities, and 
other sites where personal contacts and area-specific 
knowledge is essential. But if informational differ- 
ences are driving the results, we should also observe 
geographic moving gains for the large sample of RN 
hospital stayers, and markedly lower gains (or losses) 
change hospital status.'5 
The specification in column 4 provides 
estimates of the hospital premium that can 
differ depending on the sector from which 
RNs enter or exit. Three separate dummy 
variables are included for changing hospi- 
tal employment status (dummies are in- 
cluded but not shown for three of the four 
types of stayers). The results show that the 
"quality-adjusted" hospital premium, which 
averaged .079 (column 2), differs ubstan- 
tially across alternative types of employ- 
ment. The wage gain for those moving 
from employment in health practitioners' 
offices to hospitals is quite large (.175), 
whereas wage changes among RNs moving 
to or from employment in nursing homes 
or other industries are much smaller (.100 
and .050). 
These results contrast with the cross-sec- 
tional differentials (Table 2) showing simi- 
lar RN wages in health practitioners' of- 
fices and nursing homes. A reasonable 
explanation for these results is that whereas 
the large quality-adjusted wage differential 
between hospital and health practitioner 
RNs stems in no small part from more 
onerous working conditions in hospitals, 
the smaller wage changes observed among 
RNs switching between hospitals and nurs- 
ing homes or other employment sectors 
suggests that the hospital premium relative 
to these sectors derives primarily from 
nurse-specific ability differences. Direct 
evidence on industry-wide injury rates, al- 
though it does not provide a comprehen- 
sive measure of RN working conditions, 
indicates a very safe environment within 
practitioner offices, a relatively high-risk 
hospital environment, and dangerous em- 
ploymentwithin ursing home. In contrast 
to a 1992 economy-wide private sector rate 
of 3.6 injuries involving lost work time per 
hundred workers, employees in health prac- 
titioner offices (RNs and non-RNs) had an 
injury rate of only 0.8. The injury rate 
among the many non-hospital stayers who move. In 
fact, the data indicate little wage change among ei- 
ther group of geographic movers (these results not 
shown). 
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Table 4. Asymmetric Wage Level and 
Change Estimates of the Hospital 
Differential forJoiners and Leavers. 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Dependent Variable 
Category AInW AInW InW, InW2 
HOSP -0.024 -0.027 0.195 .0.168 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
HOSPJOIN 0.081 0.071 0.033 0.109 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) 
HOSPLEAVE -0.061 -0.053 -0.071 -0.134 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) 
HOSPJOIN*Mover 0.069 
(0.086) 
HOSPLEAVE*Mover -0.103 
(0.056) 
Mover 0.006 
(0.015) 
Notes: See notes to Table 3. Separate estimates of 
the hospital wage differential are provided based on 
the samples of RNs who are hospital joiners and 
leavers. HOSP = 1 if employment was in a hospital in 
year 1. The regression in column (3) is a levels 
regression with the log of the real wage in year 1 as the 
dependent variable and hospital status dummies in- 
cluded-HOSP, HOSPJOIN, and HOSPLEAVE, with NONHOSP 
as the omitted group. Column (4) shows similar 
results using the wage in year 2 as the dependent 
variable. 
within hospitals was 4.1 and the rate within 
nursing and personal care facilities was 9. 1, 
the latter being among the highest in the 
economy (U.S. Department of Labor 
1995:18-29, Table 1)2 16 
Table 4 shows the results of alternative 
wage change and wage level models that 
relax the assumption of symmetry between 
leavers andjoiners. The results in column 
1 show that hospital joiners receive a pre- 
16Differences in rates for hospitals and nursing 
homes overstate risk differences for RNs, since many 
of the injuries within nursing homes are suffered by 
nursing aides. In a ranking of industries based on 
back injuries involving lost work time, nursing and 
personal care facilities had the highest rate of any 
industry-3.29 per 100 workers annually, versus 0.85 
economy-wide (U.S. Department of Labor 1995:15). 
mium of 8.4% relative to non-hospital 
stayers. Hospital leavers receive about 5.9% 
lower wages than hospital stayers. (HosP=1 
if in a hospital in year 1, so leavers have a 
wage change .061 log points less than hos- 
pital stayers and .085 log points less than 
non-hospital stayers.) Column 2 allows 
separate effects for geographic movers. RNs 
whojoin a hospital but do not move receive 
a wage gain of 7.4%, while those who both 
move and join a hospital receive a gain of 
15.0% (the joint effect of HOSPJOIN and 
HOSPJOIN*Mover). Those who leave hospi- 
tals but do not move receive 5.2% lower 
wages, while those who also move receive 
an additional penalty of 9.8%. 
The results suggest rather modest asym- 
metry between the premium for joiners 
and the penalty for leavers. A test of the 
null hypothesis that the coefficient forjoin- 
ers is the same (in absolute value) as that 
for leavers fails to reject the null (F = 0.648). 
Because the RN labor market was relatively 
tight over our sample period, most RNs in 
our sample who changed employment did 
so voluntarily. This suggests that RNs 
change hospital employment to receive 
higher utility (wages, fringes, and job at- 
tributes). A hospital joiner, therefore, 
would receive a wage gain for changing 
jobs in addition to a premium for less pleas- 
ant working conditions. A leaver would 
receive a net utility gain for changing as 
well, but would see lower wages due to the 
improved working conditions of non-hos- 
pital employment. Thus, we would expect 
the loss to voluntary leavers to be lower (in 
absolute value) than the gain to joiners. 
Our results indicate that this is the case, 
although the difference is not statistically 
significant. 
The evidence on geographic movers in 
column 2 provides additional evidence on 
this point. Joiners and leavers who also 
move are more likely to be exogenous 
switchers, since the decision by RNs to move 
geographically may be tied more closely to 
the move decision of their spouses than to 
their own job opportunities. In contrast to 
our finding of somewhat larger JOIN gains 
than LEAVE losses among switchers who do 
not move (.071 versus -.053), wage losses 
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for leavers (-.156) are at least as large as the 
gain for joiners (.140) among hospital 
switchers who move. 1 7 
The effects of unmeasured ability on 
hospital premium estimates also can be 
demonstrated using wage level estimation 
incorporating information from the subse- 
quent or previous period. 8 Columns 3 and 
4 of Table 4 show wage regressions run in 
levels including dummies for the four em- 
ployment transition groups to identify ear 
one and year two wages. Included are 
dummies for first year hospital employ- 
ment (HOSP), hospital employees in year 2 
only (HOSPJOIN), and hospital employees in 
year 1 only (HOSPLEAVE), with non-hospital 
stayers the omitted comparison group. 
Column 3 uses the log real wage from 
year 1 as the dependent variable. The 
coefficient on hosP (.195) indicates a 21.5% 
premium for RNs employed in hospitals in 
year 1, as compared to RNs who will be 
employed outside of hospitals in both years. 
The coefficient on HOSPJOIN indicates that 
those who subsequently will join a hospital 
in year 2 already earn a 3.4% premium in 
non-hospital employment in year 1. That 
is, RNs are rewarded for higher ability even 
before theyjoin the hospital, and they elect 
to switch to hospital employment even 
though they are paid more in non-hospital 
employment than other RNs with identical 
measured characteristics. The coefficient 
on HOSPLEAVE indicates that in year 1, wages 
for hospital RNs who will subsequently leave 
are already 6.9% lower than those for their 
hospital co-workers, even before they exit 
the hospital. This is consistent both with 
the ability sorting hypothesis in which less 
able RNs exit hospital employment, and a 
mobility model wherein hospital RNs re- 
17An alternative approach would be to estimate an 
endogenous switching model. Because of a lack of 
adequate instruments correlated with hospital em- 
ployment but not earnings, however, we do not pur- 
sue this approach. 
'8Although the estimation of this equation is, in 
principle, equivalent to that of the wage change equa- 
tions, in practice the estimates differ, largely because 
of a differing structure of errors in levels and in 
changes (Mincer 1983). 
ceiving relatively low wages are most likely 
to leave. 
Using similar logic, the specification in 
column 4 uses the year 2 wage as the depen- 
dent variable. Those who have joined a 
hospital realize an 11.5% wage advantage 
compared to RNs in non-hospital employ- 
ment, but 5.7% (calculated from the log 
differential .109-.168 = -.059) less than 
RNs who were employed in hospitals in year 
1. Those who have left hospital employ- 
ment in year 2 receive 12.5% less than RNs 
remaining in hospital employment. 
Additional Evidence on the Source 
of the Hospital Wage Differential 
Hospital Premiums Among 
Alternative Occupations 
We have presented evidence showing that 
RNs exhibit a sizable hospital wage pre- 
mium, with roughly a third to a half reflect- 
ing higher (unmeasured) skills. The re- 
mainder results from what we believe are 
compensating differentials for working con- 
ditions. In this section we present an analy- 
sis for hospital and non-hospital workers in 
other occupations in order to gain insight 
into the nature of the RN premium. A 
finding that most hospital workers receive 
premiums similar in magnitude to that re- 
ceived by hospital RNs would support the 
thesis that substantial rents are being shared 
by all hospital workers or that there exist 
work disamenities in hospitals for all work- 
ers and not just RNs. If these premiums 
decline substantially when wage change 
analysis is employed, an implication is that 
hospitals are matched with high-quality 
workers in all occupations. 
Table 5 presents unadjusted log wage 
differentials between hospital and non-hos- 
pital workers, as well as estimated hospital 
premiums based on wage level and change 
equations. The occupations analyzed are 
health technologists and technicians (li- 
censed practical nurses and radiologic and 
other technicians); health service occupa- 
tions (including health aides and nursing 
aides); administrators and managers; sec- 
retaries, stenographers, and typists; and 
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Table 5. The Hospital Premium for Alternative Occupations. 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Health 
Health Service Administrators Cleaning 
Description Technologies Occupations and Managers Secretaries Occupations 
Unadjusted Log Wage Differential 0.065 0.178 0.140 -0.006 0.042 
Regression Coefficients: 
Hospital (from wage level eqn.) 0.063 0.152 0.050 -0.011 -0.003 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) 
AHospital (from wage change 0.037 0.103 0.052 0.016 0.121 
eqn.) (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.016) (0.027) 
Sample Size 12,484 16,382 65,591 44,349 18,961 
Number of Switchers 578 646 252 459 223 
%Hosp (in at least 1 year) 57.1 31.2 3.0 6.7 10.7 
Source: Combined ORG/March panels from 1979/80 through 1994/95. 
Notes: The unadjusted wage differential is the difference between the average log hospital wage and the 
average log non-hospital wage for each occupation. The coefficient on Hospital is the coefficient on a hospital 
dummy in a log wage regression. This regression also includes as right-hand-side variables potential experience 
and its square, years of schooling, and dummies for race (2), Hispanic, sex, metropolitan area, marital status (2), 
part-time status, region (8), and year (15). The coefficient on AHospital is the coefficient on a wage change 
equation that also includes the changes in part-time status, public employment, experience squared, and year 
dummies. 
cleaning and building service occupations. 
Hospital differentials are evident among 
all occupations apart from secretaries, but 
are substantially smaller than those for RNs. 
Unlike the results for RNs, there is little 
evidence of a large compensating premium 
for higher skills among non-RN hospital 
workers, as seen by the rather small abso- 
lute changes in the premiums moving from 
wage level to wage change estimates. While 
selective matching on quality and a large 
hospital skill premium appear to be unique 
to RNs, non-skill-related (that is, longitu- 
dinal) hospital premiums of roughly 5- 
10%-similar in size to the premium ob- 
served for RNs-are realized by administra- 
tors and managers, cleaning occupation 
workers, and workers in health service oc- 
cupations. In contrast, health technolo- 
gists and secretaries display small longitu- 
dinal premiums on the order of 2-4%. 
Were the non-skill-related premiums due 
to rent-sharing, we would expect the rents 
to be shared by most hospital workers, re- 
gardless of occupation, with lengthy queues 
of qualified applicants. This is not the case. 
The comparison of hospital premiums 
among RNs with those for other occupa- 
tional groups does not allow us to conclude 
decisively whether it is working conditions 
that account for the longitudinal premi- 
ums, absent more direct evidence on job 
disamenities and how they differ by occu- 
pation. What we can conclude from this 
analysis is that (1) the magnitude of the 
hospital wage premium is substantially 
larger for RNs than for other occupational 
groups; (2) although a substantial share of 
the RN hospital premium is accounted for 
by high unmeasured skill among hospital 
nurses, positive sorting on skill is not im- 
portant for other hospital occupations; and 
(3) a hospital wage advantage is evident 
among some but not all hospital workers, 
and where it is in evidence, probably it 
largely reflects unmeasured differences in 
working conditions between hospital and 
non-hospital employment. 
Hospital Versus Non- 
Hospital Fringe Benefits 
The analysis to this point has considered 
only monetary compensation. One possi- 
bility is that hospitals pay higher wages to 
compensate for lower non-wage benefits. 
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Table 6. Additional Evidence on the Hospital Premium for Registered Nurses. 
Measure Hospital Non-Hospital N 
1. Pensions 12,002 
Plan Offered 0.824 0.648 
Coverage 0.643 0.522 
2. Health Insurance 12,002 
Coverage 0.743 0.598 
All Paid 0.383 0.458 
Some Paid 0.585 0.505 
None Paid 0.032 0.037 
Family Covered 0.497 0.466 
3. AFQT (percentile score) 67.8 53.2 89 
4. Measures of Market Experience 
a) Work Exp./Potential Exp. (SIPP) 0.927 0.859 378 
b) Company Tenure/Potential Exp. (SIPP) 0.448 0.278 378 
c) Company Tenure/Potential Exp. (CPS) 0.475 0.294 2,663 
d) Occupational Tenure/Potential Exp. (CPS) 0.709 0.635 2,763 
5. Union Coverage Coeff. (s.e.) 0.016 0.076 34,797 
(0.005) (0.009) 
6. Proportion DualJob 0.098 0.129 71,127 
Single Job Holders, Primary Wage 17.77 15.88 63,439 
Dual Job Holders, Primary Wage 18.55 17.00 7,688 
RNs with Second Job in Hospital 3,083 
ln W- ln W -0.012 0.078 
RNs with Second Job in Nonhospital 4,605 
lnW- lnW -0.104 0.012 s P 
Sources and definitions: Data for rows 1 and 2 are from the March CPS surveys from 1980 through 1995. 
Definitions of items in the first column: Coverage-percentage of employees covered by employer-sponsored 
health insurance or pension plans; AllPaid-portion of health insurance plans paid in full by the employer; Some 
Paid-proportion paid in part by the employer; None Paid-proportion paid in full by the employee; Family 
Covered-proportion of those with insurance that covers some or all of their- family members; AFQT-mean 
AFQT percentile score, taken from the 1991 cross-section of the NLSY; Work Exp. /Potential Exp. -ratio of actual 
work experience to potential experience, taken from the 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation; 
Company Tenure/PotentialExp. -ratio of company tenure to potential experience, taken from the SIPP; Company 
Tenure/Potential Exp. and Occupational Tenure/Potential Exp. (rows 4c and 4d) -ratio of company tenure and 
occupational tenure to potential experience, taken from the CPS tenure supplements forJanuary 1983, 1987, 
and 1991; Union Coverage Coeff. -regression coefficients on union coverage from a pooled log wage equation 
including separate hospital and non-hospital interaction terms, using data from the 1983-94 CPS ORG files; 
Proportion DualJob-proportion who hold more than one position in nursing for pay, taken from the Sample 
Survey of Registered Nurses for 1984, 1988, and 1992; Primary Wage-average real wage in the primary job (in 
December 1 994 dollars); ln W-mean log wage in the primary job; ln Wi-mean log wage in the secondary job. 
The March CPS supplements contain 
information on the availability of health 
insurance and pension plans. Row 1 of 
Table 6 shows that hospital employees 
have a higher probability of being of- 
fered a pension plan by their employer 
and of participating in this plan than do 
non-hospital employees. While 52.2% of 
non-hospital RNs have pension coverage 
(other than Social Security), 64.3% of 
hospital RNs are covered. The result for 
health insurance is similar: about three- 
quarters of hospital RNs are covered by 
an employer-sponsored health insurance 
program, compared to only 60% of non- 
hospital RNs. Of those with insurance 
plans, similar proportions of hospital and 
non-hospital employers pay for at least 
part of the plan. These results show that, 
if anything, the hospital RN wage advan- 
tage understates the advantage in total 
compensation. 
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Evidence on Nursing Skills: AFQT, 
Work Experience, Tenure, and 
Occupational Experience 
The CPS data set used in our analysis 
contains few direct measures of skill. Our 
panel analysis indicates that a substantial 
portion of the hospital wage premium is 
accounted for by unmeasured worker-spe- 
cific skills. In this section, we use alterna- 
tive data sets with evidence on cognitive 
ability, occupational experience, company 
tenure, and work experience among hospi- 
tal and non-hospital RNs. If hospital RNs 
have higher productivity than RNs in other 
sectors, then we should observe correspond- 
ing differences in these measurable corre- 
lates of worker skill. 
We first turn to the National Longitudi- 
nal Survey of Youth (NLSY), which admin- 
istered the Armed Forces Qualifying Test 
(AFQT) in 1981, with individuals ranging 
in age from 16 to 24 at the time they were 
tested (scores were renormed in 1989). 
The AFQT, a widely used measure of indi- 
vidual premarket cognitive ability, is ex- 
pressed as a percentile score and is based 
on the average of four tests included in the 
broader Armed Services Vocational Apti- 
tude Battery. We use the 1991 cross-section 
of the NLSY, which contains data on 89 
RNs, 72 employed in hospitals and 17 out- 
side of hospitals. 
As seen in line 3 of Table 6, the mean 
AFQT percentile score for RNs is 65.1, sub- 
stantially higher than the 50 percentile 
population average and the mean scores of 
49.4 and 30.4 for LPNs and nursing aides, 
respectively (because the NLSYoversamples 
minorities, all figures are sample-weighted 
means). Consistent with expectations, we 
find that hospital RNs have a mean AFQT 
percentile score of 67.8, as compared to a 
mean of 53.2 for non-hospital RNs. Be- 
cause aptitude test scores increase with age, 
we also ran a (sample-weighted) regression 
with AFQT on the left-hand side, and a 
hospital dummy and dummies for age 
when the exam was administered on the 
right-hand side. The coefficient (stan- 
dard error) on the hospital dummy was 
13.49 (5.74), very similar to the 14.6 per- 
centile difference without age adjust- 
ment. 
Although the observed difference in 
premarket aptitude between hospital and 
non-hospital RNs adds support to our abil- 
ity hypothesis, ability differences measured 
by the AFQT account for at most a modest 
portion of the labor market skill advantage 
among hospital RNs. In a wage regression 
similar to that estimated in Table 2, we 
obtain an estimate of the hospital premium 
of .32 log points. Following control for 
AFQT, the estimated hospital advantage 
declines to .27. Although AFQT scores 
capture some of the skills valued in nursing 
markets, most of the worker-specific skills 
reflected in our longitudinal analysis in- 
volve abilities not measured by general ap- 
titude tests.'9 
In lines 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d of Table 6, 
evidence is provided on work experience, 
company tenure, and occupational tenure. 
We measure each of these proxies for mar- 
ket skill relative to years of potential expe- 
rience (that is, years since completing 
schooling), the variable used in our empiri- 
cal work. In each of these cases, hospital 
RNs display an advantage relative to non- 
hospital RNs. Work experience data on 
378 RNs included in the 1990 Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
indicate that hospital RNs have worked 
92.7% of their potential years of experi- 
ence, as compared to 85.9% among non- 
hospital RNs.2") The SIPP also contains 
information on tenure on the current job, 
and line 4b indicates that hospital RNs have 
spent 45% of their potential experience 
'9Cawley et a]. (1996) provided evidence from the 
NLSY that measured cognitive ability, while corre- 
lated with wages, explains little of the variance in 
wages across individuals or over time, as compared to 
schooling and family background measures. Neal 
and Johnson (1996), however, showed that differ- 
ences in AFQT scores, absent control for schooling 
and other wage correlates, account for a sizable share 
of mean black-white wage differences. 
2"The work experience variable in the SIPP was 
calculated as the number of years the individual 
worked at least 6 months in that year. The SIPP data 
were kindly provided to us by Marjorie Baldwin. 
NURSES 573 
with their current employer, compared to 
28% for non-hospital RNs. Turning next to 
CPS tenure supplements forJanuary 1983, 
1987, and 1991, hospital RNs are found to 
have spent 48% of their potential experi- 
ence with their current employer, as com- 
pared to 29% among non-hospital RNs. 
Finally, occupational tenure (obtained from 
the same CPS surveys) relative to potential 
experience is high for RNs, accounting for 
71 % of potential years among hospital RNs 
and 64% among non-hospital RNs. 
The evidence provided in this section 
provides some insight into the sources of 
unmeasured worker-specific skills reflected 
in our previous longitudinal estimates. 
Differences between hospital and non-hos- 
pital RNs in AFQT scores, work experience, 
and firm and occupational tenure rein- 
force our conclusion that unmeasured skills 
account for a significant portion of the 
hospital wage advantage. 
Union and Employer Size 
Effects on the Hospital Premium 
The panel results in Tables 3 and 4 were 
estimated without controlling for union 
status, since the March surveys do not ask 
retrospective questions on union coverage 
(the monthly ORG earnings files began 
including union status questions injanuary 
1983). Because most unionized RNs are 
employed in hospitals or "other industries" 
(see Table 1), it is possible that the hospital 
premium is driven by differences in union 
status. The union premium for RNs is far 
too small, however, to account for much of 
the hospital premium (for evidence on the 
RN union premium, see Adamache and 
Sloan 1982; Cain et al. 1981; Feldman and 
Scheffler 1982; or Hirsch and Schumacher, 
forthcoming). When we include the change 
in union status in a wage-change equation 
(using only the ORG panels from 1983/84- 
1993/94), the coefficient on the change in 
hospital employmentfalls only slightly, from 
0.059 to 0.057, indicating that little of the 
hospital premium is explained by union 
status. Consistent with prior evidence, we 
find that union premiums are smaller in 
hospitals than in non-hospital settings. Row 
5 of Table 6 reveals a union-nonunion dif- 
ferential for RNs within hospitals of only 
1.6%, as compared to a differential of 
7.9% in non-hospital settings. Although 
the magnitudes of the union premiums 
are small, this pattern is consistent with 
the economy-wide finding of smaller 
union premiums among large employers 
than among small employers (Mellow 
1983). 
Previous research has demonstrated a 
large economy-wide employer size effect 
(Brown and Medoff 1989). Since hospitals 
tend to be large, part of the premium could 
be due to a phenomenon similar to one 
that occurs in other large firms or establish- 
ments. In work not shown, we examined 
the effects of employer size in the nursing 
labor market using the CPS benefit supple- 
ments for May 1979, 1983, and 1988. Our 
results show that there are large size effects 
and that the hospital premium falls sub- 
stantially when we control for either firm or 
establishment size. There remains a signifi- 
cant premium, however, of between 5% 
and 6%. Our result with respect to size 
does not explain the hospital premium, but 
suggests that the explanation may involve 
many of the same factors driving the 
economy-wide employer size effect. And 
evidence suggests that some of the size 
premium reflects higher-skilled workers 
among large employers (for example, 
Brown and Medoff 1989; Reilly 1995). 
The Effects of Secondary Jobs 
Many RNs work in second jobs as nurses, 
some within hospitals and others outside of 
hospitals. The use of dual job information 
provides an alternative method for measur- 
ing the hospital wage differential, control- 
ling for unmeasured person-specific skills. 
Whereas longitudinal analysis measures 
wage changes for given nurses changing 
sectors over time, the dual job analysis 
measures wage differences for given nurses 
taking jobs in different sectors during a 
single time period. Both methods control 
for worker fixed effects. The dual job com- 
parison, however, is complicated by the 
fact that multiple job holders presumably 
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face a maximum hours constraint on at 
least one of their jobs. 
The Sample Survey of Registered Nurses 
(SSRN) asks licensed RNs if they hold more 
than one nursing job for pay. If they re- 
spond yes, the survey then asks about their 
sector of employment, as well as hours 
worked per week, number of weeks worked 
per year, and annual earnings on the sec- 
ond job. Row 6 of Table 6 provides infor- 
mation from the SSRN. Approximately 
10% of hospital RNs and 13% of non-hospi- 
tal RNs work at second nursingjobs, 40% of 
these second jobs (for both groups) being 
in hospitals. Evident from row 6 is that 
wages in the primary job among dual job 
holders exceed the wages of singlejob hold- 
ers, suggesting that dual job RNs tend to be 
highly motivated or skilled. 
Row 6 provides log wage differences be- 
tween the secondary and primary jobs for 
the four possible groups of dual job hold- 
ers. Letting P represent the primaryjob, S 
the secondary job, Ha hospital job, and N 
a non-hospitaljob, we observe the log wage 
difference ln Ws- ln Wp for those whose (P, 
S) job pairs are HH, NN, NH, and HN. 
Sectoral stayers show little log wage dif- 
ference between their secondary and pri- 
maryjobs, -.01 for hospital stayers and .01 
for non-hospital stayers. (Owing to a high 
variance in second job wages, mean dollar 
wages are higher in secondary than in pri- 
maryjobs for both groups.) Among sectoral 
movers, we observe a .08 wage gain for 
hospital 'joiners" (NH) and a -.10 wage 
change for hospital "leavers" (HN). We can 
impose symmetry on wage differences for 
sectoral stayers and changers by regressing 
ln Ws- ln Wp on AHOSP. This yields a coeffi- 
cient on AHOSP of .092 (with a standard 
error of .012). This quality-adjusted hospi- 
tal wage advantage estimate of .09, based 
on dual job sectoral changers, is highly 
similar to our earlier estimate of a .08 
hospital advantage based on sectoral 
changers over time (Table 3). These 
results reinforce our earlier conclusion 
that a significant portion of the cross- 
sectional hospital premium reflects 
higher unmeasured skills among hospi- 
tal nurses. 
Shift Differentials 
The results thus far suggest that roughly 
a third to a half of the cross-sectional hospi- 
tal premium is due to omitted skill, while 
the remainder is a premium directly re- 
lated to hospital employment, presumably 
due to compensating differences for job 
attributes. Information onjob characteris- 
tics (shift worked, level of risk at the job, 
and so on) would allow this latter presump- 
tion to be tested more directly. 
The 1985 and 1991 dualjob supplements 
to the May CPS survey contain work shift 
information. To get a full sample (since 
only a quarter of the May survey, the outgo- 
ing rotation groups, contain information 
on earnings), we merged these May supple- 
ments with the full-year ORG data (workers 
not outgoing in May are outgoing in June, 
July, or August, with earnings information 
in one of these months). These data allow 
us to estimate the shift premium and see 
how accounting for shift affects the hospi- 
tal wage differential. 
The top panel of Table 7 shows mean 
wages and employment status by shift. 
About half of the sample works the daytime 
shift, and real wages are lowest for these 
RNs. Evening shift nurses earn, on average, 
5.0% higher wages than day shift nurses, 
and night shift nurses earn 12.7% higher 
wages than day shift nurses. A large propor- 
tion of evening and night shift RNs are 
employed in hospitals, while few RNs in 
health practitioners' offices work evenings 
or nights. Those working split or rotating 
shifts earn higher wages and are more likely 
to be employed in hospitals than are day 
shift nurses. 
The second panel of Table 7 displays the 
effects of controlling for shift on hospital 
premium estimates. A regression that does 
not include shift dummies indicates that 
hospital RNs in this sample receive 21.0% 
higher wages than RNs in nursing homes 
and 31.7% higher wages than those em- 
ployed in health practitioners' offices. 
When shift dummies are included, wage 
differences between RNs in the four indus- 
try classifications are lowered. 
While the estimated effects of control- 
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Table 7. Evidence on the Shift Premium for Registered Nurses. 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Practitioner's 
Shift(s) n Real Wage (1994 $) Hospital Nursing Home Office 
All Shifts 1,242 17.21 0.714 0.068 0.051 
Day Shift 703 16.60 0.619 0.067 0.083 
Evening Shift 172 17.42 0.849 0.081 0.006 
Night Shift 150 18.70 0.840 0.107 0.007 
Rotating or Split Shift 129 17.70 0.876 0.031 0.008 
Other Shift 88 18.39 0.761 0.045 0.023 
Regression Results 
Variable (1) (2) 
Hospital 0.201 0.183 
(0.025) (0.025) 
Nursing Home 0.010 0.007 
(0.041) (0.041) 
Practitioner's Office -0.074 -0.066 
(0.046) (0.045) 
Evening Shift 0.037 
(0.027) 
Night Shift 0.110 
(0.028) 
Rotating or Split Shift 0.046 
(0.030) 
Other Shift 0.043 
(0.035) 
F ratio (4,983) 3.983 
Sources: May 1985 and 1991 dual job supplements to the CPS, merged with the ORG files. 
Notes: The F ratio tests the joint significance of the shift variables. A split shift is defined as "one consisting 
of two distinct periods each day," and a rotating shift is "one that changes periodically from days to evenings or 
nights." Other variables included are years of schooling, experience and its square, and dummies for region (8), 
public employment, gender, race (2), marital status (2), and year. 
ling for shift are as expected, they are rather 
modest. The difference in earnings be- 
tween hospital and nursing home RNs falls 
only slightly, consistent with the use of 
night shifts in both hospitals and nursing 
homes. The differential between hospital 
and health practitioners' office RNs, where 
most hours are first shift, falls by more than 
three percentage points. Similarly, the dif- 
ferential between hospital RNs and RNs 
employed in other industries declines by 
about 2 percentage points. These results 
are consistent with the implication of Table 
3 (column 4) that RNs in health practitio- 
ners' offices earn lower wages primarily 
because of relatively pleasant working con- 
ditions, while nursing home RNs have lower 
wages due to lower skills. 
The magnitudes of the shift variables are 
interesting in their own right (for evidence 
from manufacturing, see Kostiuk 1990). 
The shift premium to evening shift RNs is 
almost 4%, while for night shift RNs it is 
11.6%. There is a small insignificant pre- 
mium for working rotating or split shifts as 
compared to day shift. Although shift pre- 
miums are significant wage determinants, 
they explain just under 10% of the cross- 
sectional wage differential between hos- 
pitals and health practitioners' offices 
(they explain a greater proportion of the 
non-ability component) and little of the 
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differential between hospitals and nursing 
homes. 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this study has been to 
shed light on the sources of the large hospi- 
tal wage premium realized by registered 
nurses. Cross-sectional regressions that 
control for measurable worker characteris- 
tics show an almost 20% wage difference 
between hospital and non-hospital RNs. 
Evidence on the receipt of health insur- 
ance and pension coverage suggests that 
the hospital compensation premium is even 
larger. 
Panel estimates from wage change mod- 
els indicate that from a third to a half of the 
hospital premium is due to hospitals at- 
tracting nurses of higher (unmeasured) 
ability. We conclude that much of the 
remaining differential is due to a compen- 
sating differential for differences in work- 
ing conditions. Direct evidence on worker 
ability and job characteristics upports our 
interpretation. Hospital RNs have higher 
cognitive ability than non-hospital RNs, as 
measured by AFQT scores, and also have 
higher-quality experience, as measured by 
the ratios of total market experience, com- 
pany tenure, and occupational tenure to 
potential experience. A measurable job 
characteristic, shift work, accounts for 
roughly 10% of the cross-sectional hospital 
premium.21 
21Close to 90% of young RNs (those below age 35) 
are found in hospitals, and many RNs move to non- 
hospital employment following their hospital experi- 
ence and training. To the extent that RNs pay for 
general training in the form of lower wages, the 
hospital premium may be understated by our esti- 
mates, since hospital RNs receive not only higher 
wages and fringe benefits, but also training that in- 
creases their subsequent earnings. Separate esti- 
mates of the hospital premium for young and old 
RNs, however, indicate that while the hospital differ- 
ential rises slightly with age when hospital RNs are 
compared to RNs in "other" industries (from .109 for 
those between the ages of 20 and 35, to .134 for those 
between the ages of 35 and 50, to .142 for those older 
than 50), it does not increase with age when the 
comparison group is RNs in practitioners' offices 
(.202, .201, and .217 for the three age groups), and it 
decreases slightly with age when the comparison group 
is RNs in nursing homes (.211, .179, and .160). 
Despite the importance of hospital em- 
ployment among RNs, and the large magni- 
tude of wage differences between hospital 
and non-hospital employment, little re- 
search has been directed at uncovering the 
sources of the premium. Our study takes a 
step in this direction. Based on cross-sec- 
tional and panel analysis using large data 
sets constructed from various CPS files, 
we conclude that hospital RNs receive 
compensating differentials for higher un- 
measured abilities and less pleasant work- 
ing conditions. The analysis provides 
not only what we believe is an interesting 
study of compensating wage differentials, 
but also insight into the nature of wage 
determination in an important labor mar- 
ket.22 
Our study also may shed light on the 
impact of evolving medical care patterns. 
Medical care services have begun to shift 
from in-patient hospital facilities to out- 
patient hospital and non-hospital settings. 
Indeed, a recent national commission study 
(the Pew Health Professions Commission) 
forecast that up to half of the nation's 
hospitals will close within five years and 
calculated a steep loss in nursingjobs, based 
primarily on expected bed closures. (Brider 
[ 1996] provides an appropriately skeptical 
critique of the commission study.) What- 
ever shifts do occur will not lead to RN 
employment loss proportional to the loss of 
hospital beds, but will decrease the share of 
total RN employment in hospitals. 
At first glance, the existence of a large 
hospital premium might lead to the expec- 
tation that the shift out of hospital employ- 
ment will result in a significant wage de- 
cline for RNs. Despite the sizable hospital 
premium, the conclusion that RN wages 
and labor costs will decline substantially 
need not follow. First, our results show that 
as much as half of the hospital premium 
reflects unmeasured ability, with skill pre- 
miums received by high-ability RNs in or 
out of hospitals. Second, half or more of 
22Registered nurses comprise the third largest 
Census occupation among women, trailing secretar- 
ies and teachers. 
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the hospital premium may result from less 
pleasant or more demanding working con- 
ditions in hospitals. To the extent that such 
working conditions are transferred to non- 
hospital settings, the compensating pre- 
mium associated with thesejob disamenities 
will follow. Such a shift will increase rela- 
tive RN wages in non-hospital settings and 
lower the measured hospital premium (its 
decline since 1992 is suggestive), while hav- 
ing only a modest effect on overall nursing 
labor costs. 
APPENDIX 
Construction of Longitudinal Samples from the CPS ORG Files and the March CPS 
The CPS sample design is such that households 
are included in 8 surveys (rotation groups), begin- 
ning with 4 consecutive months in, followed by 8 
months out, followed by 4 months in. Outgoing 
rotation groups 4 and 8 are asked earnings supple- 
ment questions (weekly earnings, hours, union sta- 
tus, and so on). The CPS contains household identi- 
fication numbers (ID) and record line numbers, but 
not individual identifiers. Individuals potentially can 
be identified for the same month in consecutive 
years; that is, individuals in rotation 4 in year 1 can be 
matched to individuals in rotation 8 in year 2. 
The longitudinal ORG file was created in the 
following manner. Separate data files were created 
for men and women, and for pairs of years (rotation 
4/1983 and rotation 8/1984, rotation 4/1984 and 
rotation 8/1985, and so on). Within each file, indi- 
viduals were sorted as appropriate on the basis of 
ascending and descending household ID, year, and 
age. To be considered an acceptable matched pair, a 
rotation 8 individual and rotation 4 individual had to 
have identical household ID, identical survey month, 
and an age difference between 0 and 2 (since surveys 
can occur on different days of the month, age change 
need not equal 1). Several passes were necessary 
because a single household may contain more than 
one male or female pair. Checks were provided to 
ensure that only unique matches were selected. For 
each rotation 8 individual, the search was made 
through all rotation 4 individuals with the same ID to 
make sure there was only one possible match; the file 
was resorted in reverse order and each selected rota- 
tion 4 individual was checked to ensure a unique 
rotation 8 match. As uniquely matched pairs were 
identified, they were removed from the work file. 
Incorrect changes in the variables marital status, vet- 
eran status, race, and education (a change in school- 
ing other than 0 or 1, a change from married to never 
married, and so on) were used to delete "bad" obser- 
vations in households where there were multiple 
observations and ages too close to separate matched 
pairs. Several passes at the data were made. In 
households where two pairs of individuals could be 
separated based on a 1-year but not the 0-to-2 year age 
change, a 1-year criterion was used. If a unique pair 
could not be identified based on these criteria, they 
were not included in the data set (for example, four 
observations with two identical pairs, or three indi- 
viduals with two possible matches usinlg the 0-to-2 age 
change criterion). 
In some cases we were unable to create a match or 
to include individual worker pairs in the CPS ORG 
panel. The conditions that most often prevented us 
from doing so were the following: a household moved 
(thus changing the household ID); an individual 
moved out of a household; a worker became self- 
employed; an individual dropped out of the labor 
market or failed to meet other sample selection crite- 
ria; or the Census was unable to reinterview a house- 
hold or receive information on the individual. Inclu- 
sion rates for the entire CPS ORG panel are just 
under two-thirds of employed wage and salary work- 
ers in any year; rates are somewhat lower in our RN 
sample. Peracchi and Welch (1995) analyzed attri- 
tion rates among matched March CPS files and con- 
cluded that age is the most important determinant of 
a successful match. Other factors that lessen match 
probabilities are poor health, low schooling, and not 
a household head, while sex and race are unimpor- 
tant match predictors following control for other 
factors. Finally, sample sizes are reduced further to 
roughly half the normal size for the 1984/85 panel 
and to one-quarter for 1985/86. This is the result of 
a CPS test sample from July-September 1985 that 
implemented new population weights. Rotation 4 
households interviewed inJuly 1984 through Septem- 
ber 1985 were not reinterviewed a year later in 1985 
and 1986. 
The March CPS longitudinal file is a retrospective 
panel. All rotation groups in March are asked infor- 
mation about earnings, weeks worked, and hours 
worked last year, and occupation and industry on the 
longestjob held last year. A quarter sample in March 
(the ORGs) are asked current earnings, hours, and so 
on. All those in the March sample are matched to 
their earnings supplement records in their outgoing 
month, either March, April, May, or June. These 
records were matched initially on the basis of house- 
hold ID and line number, followed by checks on 
changes in sex and age to ensure an accurate match. 
The March retrospective panel is about three-quar- 
ters the size of a March sample based on the presence 
of earnings last year (and other typical variables). 
Losses are due to households moving, individuals 
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leaving the household, changing employment sta- 
tus (that is, leaving the labor force or shifting to 
self-employment), changing line number, a failure 
to be reinterviewed, and missing hours or weekly 
earnings in the earnings supplement among em- 
ployed wage and salary workers who are otherwise 
matched. The March CPS file and CPS ORG panel 
files are merged, with the March-June records 
deleted from the CPS ORG files to prevent double 
counting. 
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